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Abstract
This paper assesses the existence of persistent seasonal eﬀects in the daily returns
of the Portuguese stock market. We use daily data on the stock market index to
study long-lasting diﬀerences in returns across the days of the week, within months
and around holidays. For the period 1988-2001, we ﬁnd no evidence that daily re-
turns are diﬀerent between weekdays. However, we ﬁnd a closed-market eﬀect during
1988-1996. This eﬀect disappears for the 1997-2001 period which coincides with the
period from when the Portuguese market started to be internationally considered as
a developed market.
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In this paper we test for the presence of seasonal eﬀects on the daily returns of the Por-
tuguese stock market.
Stock exchanges are usually closed from Friday to Monday. If the return process is to
be continuously generated, Monday returns are expected to be three times the standard
daily returns. This hypothesis is often named ‘calendar-time’. However, if one assumes
that the return process is based only on trading days, returns are expected to be equal for
all the days of the week. This hypothesis is often named ‘trading-day’. Regardless of the
existing assumptions for the patterns of returns, several papers ﬁnd evidence of a persistent
closed-market eﬀect. According to this eﬀect, daily returns are positive before markets are
closed and tend to be negative following the non-trading days. Evidence of this so-called
market anomaly is found after weekend returns (weekend eﬀect) and after holiday returns
(holiday eﬀect) (French (1980), Board and Sutcliﬀe (1988), Lakonishok and Smidt (1988),
Arsad and Coutts (1997)). According to Board and Sutcliﬀe (1988), this persistent eﬀect
tends to disappear in time while Arsad and Coutts (1997) ﬁnd that the eﬀects persist.
In this paper we analyze some persistent eﬀects in the Portuguese stock market. Looking
at the 1988-2001 period, our results do not support a signiﬁcant general closed-market eﬀect.
However, we present evidence that the incipient structure of the Portuguese market of the
late 1980s reveals diﬀerences in returns across the days of the week that tend to disappear
as the market becomes more mature.
From the late 1980s to the present, increases in foreign capital inﬂows, portfolio in-
vestment and privatization sales, changed the shape and the size of the Portuguese stock
markets. During 1997, the World Bank upgraded the Portuguese stock market to a devel-
oped market. This fast moving and increasingly integrated market suggests the relevance
of the analysis of the time persistency of the market anomalies. The changes in market
structure are in accordance with our ﬁndings. We ﬁnd that the market ineﬃciency tends to
disappear in time and the diﬀerences in returns observed for the period 1998-1996 vanish
1when we analyze the period 1997-2001.
Returns around holidays are in accordance with what is found in Lakonishok and Smidt
(1988). For the 1988-2001 period, we ﬁnd that before-holiday returns are signiﬁcantly higher
than the after-holiday returns. Furthermore, we observe that before-holiday returns are on
average 23 times higher than the standard daily returns.
Finally we analyze whether returns change according to the calender month. According
to the literature, 1 capital gains and tax presssures may aﬀect the returns for special months
of the year. We ﬁnd no evidence of such behavior for the Portuguese stock market.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we provide the main empirical evidence
found in the literature regarding the persistent eﬀects and in section 3 we describe the
behavior of the Portuguese stock market index, since it was created, in January 1988, until
the end of 2001. In sections 4 to 6 we analyze the weekend, holiday and monthly eﬀect,
respectively. Section 7 provides the main conclusions.
2 Literature Review on the Evidence on Seasonal Ef-
fects
The study of market anomalies assesses three main subjects: the weekend eﬀect, the hol-
iday eﬀect and the monthly eﬀect. The empirical evidence of the persistent eﬀects across
daily returns is summarized in Tables I-III. Some studies related to market anomalies show
evidence of: signiﬁcant diﬀerences in mean returns across the days of the week, with neg-
ative returns on Monday; higher mean returns before holidays than on regular days and
higher mean returns on regular days than on days following holidays; signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in mean returns across the months of the year with positive mean returns in January.
Table I presents an overview of the main studies concerning the analysis of the week-
end eﬀect. The major part of these studies show evidence of negative (and sometimes
signiﬁcant) mean returns on Mondays, while mean returns on Fridays tend to be positive,
1Santesmases (1980), Arsad and Coutts (1997) and Reinganum and Shapiro (1987).
2rejecting both the calendar and the trading day hypothesis. Keim and Stambaugh (1984)
study the presence of weekend eﬀects for the S&P Composite index, between 1928 and
1982.2 Before 1952, the authors ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative returns on Monday and insignif-
icant positive mean returns on Friday. After 1952, mean returns on Monday are more
negative and tend to be signiﬁcant positive on Friday. Keim and Stambaugh (1984) and
Athanassakos and Robinson (1994) group stocks into portfolios ordered by market value
and ﬁnd signiﬁcantly negative returns on Mondays while returns increase through the week.
Both authors reject the hypothesis that returns are equal across weekdays.3 Looking at
the Istanbul Stock Index, Balaban (1995) ﬁnds that the percentage of positive returns is
above 50% on Friday. However, Balaban (1995) observes that, in most of the years, posi-
tive (negative) Friday returns are more frequently followed by positive (negative) Monday
returns. Similar correlation between returns on Friday and the following Monday is found
in Cross (1973), for the S&P composite index, for the 1953-1970 period.
The behavior of the returns on Friday and Monday may reﬂect the closed-market eﬀect.
If this eﬀect persists everytime the market is closed, negative mean returns are expected
to be present on days following holidays, while returns tend to be positive before holidays.
Table II presents the results of the main studies regarding the holiday eﬀect. Arsad and
Coutts (1997) have detected signiﬁcantly positive returns on the last three days before
holidays and on two trading days after holidays.
Table III presents an overview of the main studies addressing the monthly eﬀect. The
empirical evidence found in literature reveals that the January daily returns are usually
positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Santesmases (1980), Arsad and Coutts (1997)
and Reinganum and Shapiro (1987) argue that the January eﬀect is often related to capital
gains as a result of tax pressures at the end of the year.
2Before 1952, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was open on Saturday, from 10 a.m. until noon.
Between 1945 and 1952, NYSE was usually closed on Saturday during the summer months.
3Keim and Stambaugh also ﬁnd that the day-of-the-week eﬀect is stronger for smaller portfolios.
Athanassakos and Robinson conclude that mean returns on Monday are more signiﬁcant negative for
larger portfolios, while for small portfolios mean returns are more negative on Tuesdays than on Mondays.
3Additional studies analyze diﬀerences in the returns between the ﬁrst and the second
halves of the months, for the last days and for the ﬁrst days of the months. Lakonishok and
Smidt (1988) study the behavior of the Dow Jones returns between 1897 and 1986, for the
ﬁrst four and the last four trading days of the month. The authors ﬁnd that the cumulative
mean return between the last day of the month and the third day of the following month is
signiﬁcantly larger than the mean return on a regular four-day period (0.473% vs 0.0612%).
Table III presents some empirical evidence of turn-of-the-month eﬀects as a special case of
monthly eﬀects.
To test for the market persistent eﬀects, linear regressions of the stock return series
on dummy variables are frequently estimated. As is widely documented (Campbell, Lo
and MacKinlay (1997)), stock returns do not seem to follow a log normal distribution
and present time series correlations. In order to account for these factors, some authors
report skewness and kurtosis tests for the returns (Theobald and Price (1984), Alexakis
and Xantakis (1995)) or run some linear regressions and then test the skewness and the
kurtosis values for the errors (Connolly (1989), Easton and Faﬀ (1994)). For the BVLG
index returns, the skewness is equal to —0.6205 and the kurtosis is equal to 16.6647.4 These
results are relatively similar to the ones found by Alexakis and Xanthakis (1995) for 1988-
1994 (skewness = -0.9453; kurtosis = 17.7880). Individual and joint tests for these two
statistics lead us to reject the hypothesis that skewness is equal to zero and that kurtosis
is equal to three.
Theobald and Price (1984) and Alexakis and Xanthakis (1995) show evidence of au-
tocorrelation in stock returns. In our sample, we ﬁnd that the autocorrelation function
v a l u ei sn e a r l ye q u a lt o2 6 %o nt h eﬁrst lag and is signiﬁcantly positive, at the 1% level.
Theobald and Price (1984) do not present the results for the autocorrelation function but
refer that the autocorrelation value for the ﬁrst lag is more than twice the standard error
for the FTAS5 index returns (which means signiﬁcance at the 5% level). Alexakis and
4These values are obtained using daily returns for the BVL Geral index, between the 6th of January
1988 and the 16th of November 2001.
5FTAS stands for Financial Times Actuaries All Shares. According to Theobald and Price (1984),
4Xanthakis (1995) report tests statistics for the jointly equality of the ﬁrst k lag’s auto-
correlation function, with k=6, 12, 24 and 36, for 1985-1994. They have obtained 147.27,
181.58, 196.28 and 232.95, respectively (all these values are signiﬁcant at the 1% level).
For the Portuguese index, we obtain 249.45, 273.65, 295.13 and 334.45, respectively (also
signiﬁcant at the 1% level).
Connolly (1989) and Easton and Faﬀ (1994), test the presence of ARCH eﬀects on the
residuals, ﬁnding evidence of residual’s conditional heteroskedasticity and re-estimating the
regressions under this hypothesis. As we can see in Table I, the Easton and Faﬀ (1994)
results haven’t changed, when using OLS or GARCH estimation. Alexakis and Xanthakis
(1995) have also tested ARCH eﬀects on series returns, by computing the Q statistics for
testing the jointly equality for the ﬁrst k lag’s autocorrelation function, correspondent to the
square of the returns, with k=6, 12, 24 and 36, for 1985-1994. They have obtained 157.77,
193.96, 333.40 and 454.09, respectively. For the Portuguese case, we obtain 220.9, 321.66,
418.35 and 547.74, respectively. The Portuguese and the Greek values are signiﬁcant at
the conventional levels.
In performing tests for market anomalies, we have checked for the presence of autocor-
relations, in similar way to what is done in the literature.
3 The Data - The Portuguese Stock Market Index
The BVL Geral (BVLG)6 index was established on the 5th of January 1988. It is computed
as the average of the daily close prices for all stock listed, weighted by individual ﬁrm’s
capitalization. In addition, it adjusts for ﬁrms’ idiosyncratic behaviors, namely, stock splits
and dividend payments. In the present study, we have collected daily data between the 5th
of January 1988 and the 16th of November 2001.
Throughout the past decade, both the privatization process, through public oﬀers of
FTAS is a value-weighted index of 750 UK equities.
6The Lisbon Stock Exchange and the Oporto Derivatives Exchange merged in 2000. As a result, the
BVL Geral was named PSI Geral.
5state-owned companies, and foreign investment ﬂows7,s i g n i ﬁcantly contributed to the in-
creasing liquidity and depth of the Portuguese Stock Exchange. Figure 1 presents the
evolution of the index since 1988 up to the end of 2001. The year 1997 was a signiﬁcant
milestone for the Portuguese stock exchange which started to be internationally considered
as a developed market. In October 1997, nineteen ﬁr m sw e r ei n c l u d e di nt h eD o wJ o n e s
indexes. In December, the Morgan Stanley Capital International upgraded the Portuguese
Stock Market and included the Portuguese index in the developed markets indices group.
The 1997 landmark suggests we should consider two sub-samples: 1988-1996 (Por-
tuguese Stock Exchange as an emergent market) and 1997-2001 (Portuguese Stock Ex-
change as a developed market). This partition allows us to compare among periods as well
as the persistency of the eﬀects.
The increase in the BVLG index from 1988 to 1989 (31.7%) coincided with the rise in
international stock prices8 and foreign capital inﬂows. Between the end of 1989 and 1992 a
sequence of international political and economic events9 was responsible for great ﬁnancial
instability. As a consequence, the BVLG index decreased by 41.8%. Sustained recoveries
in the main international markets during 1991 (the Dow Jones Industrials index increased
by 20%), further induced portfolio investment outﬂows into the Portuguese stock market.10
In 1993, the capital movements regulations were modiﬁed easing foreign investment
ﬂows (since then, foreign investors were allowed to purchase ﬁxed income securities with
ﬂoating rates). This fact contributed to a signiﬁcant inﬂow of foreign investment.11 The
Maastricht Treaty was ratiﬁed in November 1993, deﬁning the convergence criteria to the
7For 1996-2000 and considering quarterly data, the ratio of foreign investment on equity securities to
Portuguese equity market capitalization was, on average, 26.1%.
8During the same period, the London index increased 35.11% and the German index increased 34.83%.
9The German reuniﬁcation (1990), the exchange of political and economic systems in Eastern Europe
(1990), the Gulf War (1991), the dismemberment of Russia (1991), the Yugoslav War (1992), the massacre
in Timor (1992).
10In 1992, the Portuguese Government introduced some ﬁscal beneﬁts like tax exemptions on inter-
est earned from shares acquisition or tax incidence only on 60% of dividends earned from acquisition of
reprivatized ﬁrm’s shares.
11Foreign investment in Portuguese securities at the end of 1993 was nearly EUR 1.3 billion. One year
before, it was negative by EUR 1.5 billion.
6single European currency.12 During the second half of 1993, equity market prices and the
market turnover have signiﬁcantly increased. During 1993, the BVLG index increased by
53.2% and the market capitalization increased by 53.3%.
Poor corporate performance and the strong decrease in the main international markets
during the ﬁrst half of 1994 pushed the Portuguese index to a decrease of 17.4%. Between
the end of June and September 1994, the Portuguese Stock Market inverted the negative
trend, and posted an increase on the BVLG Geral index. As of 1994, there were 82 stocks
included in the BVLG index. In 1994 the BVLG index increased 8.4% while other major
indexes (Paris, London and Frankfurt) experienced a decreasing trend. One year later, the
Portuguese index registered a decrease of 4.6%, while in New York the Dow Jones index
rose 33.45% and the FT-SE 100 index rose 20.35%.
After November 1995 and especially during 1996, the sustained decrease in interest rates
and in public debt fuelled a rise in stock prices. As a result, the BVLG index increased
32.6% and market capitalization increased (39.6%) to around EUR 19 billion.
The favorable outlook for the main macroeconomic indicators and corporate perfor-
mance determined the equity market evolution during 1997 (the BVLG index rose 65.2%)
a n di nt h eﬁrst months of 1998. During this period, the government performed signiﬁcant
privatization sales.13 During 1997, the equity market capitalization increased by 87.1%.
The high volatility of the index between May and September 1998 coincided with the
Asian and the Russian crisis period. The spillover of the Russian crisis induced decreases in
international share indexes, including the Portuguese one. Nevertheless, the BVLG index
posted a positive 26.2% return during 1998, which was signiﬁcantly higher than the major
markets.14 This period coincided with the announcement, in May 1998, that Portugal
12The UE countries have agreed this treaty on 7th of February 1992. It was only ratiﬁed in November
1993 due to French and Danish postponing decisions.
13In 1997, demand for the privatized company’s shares was nearly 42 times the number of shares oﬀered,
reﬂecting investors’ appetite from the new privatized ﬁrms. Portugal Telecom and the national electricity
company have the highest market capitalization at the end of the year (24.8% of the total market).
14London: 14.55%; Chicago: 16.10%; New York: 16.55%.
7w o u l db ei nt h eﬁrst wave to join the Third Stage of the Monetary Union.15
The economic situation in Brazil explained the BVLG index decrease during the ﬁrst
four months of 199916, while between May and September of the same year, the index
presented great volatility, also induced by the expectation of a rise in the FED rates. After
October (and through March 2000), the release of a postive economic outlook by OECD
and the encouraging performance of the Technology, Media and Telecommunication (TMT)
sector during January and February 2000 induced an increase in Portuguese stock prices.
At the end of 2000, the equity market capitalization was EUR 116 billion, 70.6% more
than in 1999. However, the BVLG index has decreased 8.2%. By the end of 2000, six out
of the seven domestic ﬁrms with the highest market capitalization in the stock exchange
were partially state-owned.17 The year 2001 was characterized by a generalized decrease
in the BVLG index until September, when it seems to exist a gradual recovery. Some
political and economic events have contributed to the evolution of the ﬁnancial markets.18
Comparing the values at the end of 2000 and on 16 November 2001, the capitalization of
the Portuguese market decreased by 13.4%.
4T h e W e e k e n d E ﬀect
In order to analyze the persistent diﬀerence in daily returns across the days of the week,
we regress the daily returns on a set of dummy variables. Daily returns are calculated on
a continuously compounded basis Rt = ln(Pt/Pt−1).W e d e ﬁne ﬁve dummy variables —
denoted by D1t through D5t —t oa c c o u n tf o re a c hd a yo ft h ew e e k .T h i sm e a n st h a tD1t
assumes the value 1 in case t is a Monday and 0 otherwise. The remaining dummy variables
15The Third Stage of the Monetary Union was eﬀective on 4th January 1999. Portugal was among the
ﬁrst eleven countries that joined the monetary union.
16At the end of 1998, and in the ﬁrst months of 1999, the Brazilian economy was inﬂuenced by the real
depreciation. In Europe, the Kosovo conﬂict emerged.
17PT, EDP, BES, Cimpor, Brisa and Telecel. The Portuguese ﬁrm with the higher market capitalization
was BCP, while BSCH had the highest market capitalization (44.3% of the total).
18The conﬂict in the Middle East, the terrorist attacks in New York (11th September) and the instability
in Afghanistan and in neighboring countries. In Portugal: the Entre-os-Rios events on 4th March, the
incorporation of Telecel into the British group Vodafone.
8are deﬁned in similar terms.
From January 1988 to April 1989, the Portuguese stock exchange closed on Mondays,
only operating four days of the week. In the test for the weekend eﬀect we should therefore
distinguish between the two “types of Tuesdays”: one which follows the weekend (com-
prehending the 1988-1989 period) and the day corresponding to the second trading day of
the week. This situation is similar to the Spanish case, presented by Santesmases (1986),
since the Madrid Stock Exchange also closed on Mondays up until June 1984. As a conse-
quence, we consider an additional dummy variable D∗
2 that assumes the value 1 in case t
is a Tuesday from January 1988 to April 1989 (0, otherwise).
Board and Sutcliﬀe( 1 9 8 8 )a n a l y z et h ed a yo ft h ew e e ke ﬀects on the FTAS index,
including the ﬁrst lag of the returns. Easton and Faﬀ (1994) analyze the day of the week
eﬀects on the Statex-Actuaries Accumulation index, including on their model the ﬁrst four
lags of the dependent variable. In the present analysis we consider the ﬁrst three lags of
the returns series as explanatory variables.19 Days immediately after and before holidays
are excluded.









φlRt−l + εt (1)
The weekend eﬀect is tested using the hypothesis: α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = α5 = α6 (H1).
As in Board and Sutcliﬀe (1988), we further consider the Portmanteau statistics for
testing the error’s autocorrelation. Table IV presents the results. We ﬁnd that for the 1988-
2001 period as well as for the two subperiods, the hypothesis (H1) cannot be rejected. This
result is consistent with what Santesmases (1986) observes for the Madrid stock exchange.20
Looking at the 1988-1996 period, we observe that the coeﬃcient on the returns for the
Tuesday that follow a 3-day weekend is negative which is consistent with the ﬁndings of
19We have considered alternative lags on the return variable and the results do not signiﬁcantly change.
20Although Santesmases (1986) ﬁnds negative mean returns on Tuesday for the Madrid Stock Exchange
index, the hypothesis of mean returns equality across the days of the week is not rejected.
9Athanassakos and Robinson (1994).21 Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the signiﬁcance of the
joint test of equality of the coeﬃcients is less signiﬁcant for the 1997-2001 period. These
two previous evidences suggest that the weekend anomaly appears to be diminishing. This
result coincides with the Board and Sutcliﬀe (1988) ﬁndings, who observe that the weekend
eﬀect on the FTA index diminishes after 1968.
Although the autocorrelation in returns is very signiﬁcant, arbitrage opportunities that
result from persistent eﬀects do not prevail when transaction costs are taken into consid-
eration. The magnitude of the diﬀe r e n c e sa c r o s sd a i l yr e t u r n si ss m a l lw h e nc o m p a r e dt o
the stock market fees, taxes and brokers commissions.22
Table IV additionally presents the median of the returns and the percentage of positive
returns for each day of the week. Our results reveal that the percentage of positive returns
is below 50% for Monday, which also happens for Tuesdays for the 1988-89 period (when the
stock market was closed on Monday). The percentage of Friday returns that are positive
is higher than 50% for both sub-periods considered in the sample. These results support
our previous evidence and are consistent with Cross (1973).
The histograms in Figure 2 present an additional analysis for the diﬀerences in returns
across the days of the week. We ﬁnd that the mass of the histograms on the Tuesday
following a 3-days weekend is more concentrated on the negative region, which does not
hold for the remaining days of the week.
In order to explicitly measure the impact of the closed-market eﬀect, we consider the
sub-sample 1997-2001 from where we are able to draw daily data on both closing and
opening prices of the stock market index.23 With this additional information we extend the
21The authors ﬁnd that the returns on the ﬁrst trading day of the week are more signiﬁcant negative than
Monday returns and that the last day of the week eﬀect is stronger than the Friday eﬀect (with positive
returns).
22For the Portuguese stock market, transactions fees are, on average, 0.275% of total transaction amount.
This value is divided as follows: 0.25% broker fee, 0.015% stock market fees and 0.4% broker commission
value.
23Opening and closing prices are available for the PSI20 index, which was established in 1993. The index
is diﬀerent from the BVLG as it reﬂects the 20 most important securities in the market. However, the
PSI20 market capitalization represents around 90% of the total market capitalization.
10analysis performed in (1). We compute the closed-market return as an overnight return,
Rnightt = ln[Opent/Closet−1],w h i c hr e ﬂe c t st h ec h a n g eb e t w e e nt h eo p e nm a r k e tv a l u e
and the previous trading day closing value. In the regression we distinguish between the
overnight return during the week and the overnight return for Monday (in this case, the
previous day close price represents a two day diﬀerence as opposed to the remaining days
of the week). The empirical test in (1) reduces to:
Rt =( αi + β1Rnightt)D1t +
5 X
i=2
αiDit + β0Rnightt +
3 X
l=1
φlRt−l + ut (2)
Table V presents the results. As before, we ﬁnd that the coeﬁcients associated with D1
to D5 are not signiﬁcant meaning that daily returns do not diﬀer across the days of the
week. Looking at the new overnight returns, we observe that Rnight represents around 63%
of the daily returns. Comparing within weekdays, overnight returns for Monday represent
an increasing percentage of the daily returns. However, the non-signiﬁcance of the dummy
variable interacted with the overnight returns reveals that there does not seem to exist a
closed-market eﬀect across the days of the week.
5 The Holiday Eﬀect
The analysis of daily returns around holidays provides an additional test for the closed-
market eﬀect. Under this assumption, returns following holidays are expected to be negative
and pre-holidays daily returns positive.
We compute the mean returns on days before holidays, on days after holidays and on
regular days. Table VI presents the results for the holiday eﬀect. For the 1988-2001, the
mean return for the pre-holiday is 0.184%, 23 times larger than the mean return for regular
days. These results are similar to Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) who ﬁnd a pre-holiday
average daily return for the DJIA of 0.220%, also 23 higher than the standard daily return
on the index. Looking at the 1988-1996 period, we ﬁnd that the mean return on pre-
holiday is positive, while post-holiday returns are negative. This result suggests evidence
11of some closed-market eﬀect. We further distinguish between the number of non-trading
days around the holiday and ﬁnd that for the 1988-1996 period, the after-holiday eﬀect is
stronger as the number of non-trading days around holidays increases.
For the 1988-2001 period, the diﬀerence between pre and post holiday mean returns
b e c o m e sl e s sr e l e v a n ta st h en u m b e ro fd a y sb e t w e e nt h el a s tt r a d i n gd a yb e f o r ea n dt h e
ﬁrst trading day after the holiday increases.
Figure 3 presents the histograms for the returns on pre-holidays, post-holidays and
regular days. We ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more dispersion before and after holidays than on
regular days. For the 1988-2001 period, we ﬁn dt h a tt h eb e f o r eh o l i d a yh i s t o g r a m ’ sm a s si s
more concentrated on positive values. For regular days, the histogram is more concentrated
near the zero line.
6 The Monthly Eﬀect
In this section we test for the monthly eﬀect by computing a regression of the daily returns
on twelve dummy variables — denoted by Jant through Dect —t h a ta s s u m et h ev a l u e1 in
case t corresponds to January,...,December, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Similarly to (1),
we further consider the ﬁrst three lags of the dependent variable as explanatory variables.
We use the Portmanteau statistic to test for autocorrelation. Days immediately after and
before holidays are excluded from the regression. The equation to estimate is given by:
Rt = β1Jant + β2Febt + ... + β12Dect +
3 X
l=1
φlRt−l + ηt (3)
I no r d e rt ot e s tf o rd i ﬀerences in returns across the months of the year, we consider
the hypothesis: β1 = β2 = ... = β12 (H2). Table VII presents our results. We ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences across the dummies for the 1988-2001 period, which suggest that
we cannot reject hypothesis (H2). When we consider the two sub-periods, we ﬁnd that
for 1988-1996, the January coeﬃcient is negative but not signiﬁcant, while signiﬁcantly
positive during the 1997-2001 period. We ﬁnd that the January’s daily returns for 1997-
121998 are on average 0.554%, while for all years except 1997 and 1998, the mean return
are 0.088%. Looking at the BVLG index, we observe that the monthly return for January
1997 is 12.5% - the highest of the year. Between November 1997 and April 1998, the
highest returns correspond to March (15.5%) and January (14.1%). Furthermore, looking
at the international markets we ﬁnd that January’s mean daily return for 1997-1998 was
0.324% for the EuroStoxx50 and 0.249% for the FT 100. This suggests that for the period
1997-1998, the Portuguese index returns behaved similarly to the main international index
returns. Overall, we ﬁnd that the January anomaly found resumes to a 1997-1998 eﬀect
which also coincides with the period during which the Portuguese stock market starts to
be considered a developed market.
We ﬁnd that daily returns for August for 1997-1998 is on average -0.531%. For all the
sample except 1997 and 1998, this value is 0.061%. We ﬁnd that the mean daily return
on the index EuroStoxx50 for August 1997 and 1998 is nearly -0.599%, while for the other
years except 1997 and 1998 the correspondent mean is not signiﬁcant. Looking at Figure
1, we observe that the BVLG index was characterized by certain volatility during the
third quarter of 1997, while from May to September 1998, the index decreased sharply.
These ﬁndings suggest that the August eﬀect observed in our analysis is consistent with
the market evolution on 1997-1998, especially during August 1998.
The turn-of-the-month eﬀect is a special case of the monthly eﬀect. As in Lakonishok
and Smidt (1988) we consider the summary statistics for the last and the ﬁrst four trading
d a y so fam o n t h—d e n o t e db yD a y— 4t h r o u g hD a y— 1a n db yD a y+ 1t oD a y+ 4 .T a b l e
VIII presents our results. For the 1988-2001 period, we observe that the highest mean
r e t u r n so c c u r so nD a y+ 3 ,o nD a y— 3a n do nt h el a s tt r a d i n gd a yo ft h em o n t h .L i k ei n
Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) and Ariel (1987), we detect positive mean returns on the
l a s ta n do nt h eﬁrst three trading days of the month, although sometimes not signiﬁcant.
Between 1997 and 2001, mean returns are also positive from Day —1 to Day 3 (signiﬁcantly
on Day +3, at the 10% level). For the 1988-1996 period, average returns for the last trading
day are signiﬁcantly positive.
137C o n c l u s i o n
The several methodologies used in the present paper, including return regression analysis,
histograms and mean analysis, agree in ﬁnding that the weekend eﬀect for the Portuguese
stock market tends to disappear in time as the stock market becomes more sophisticated
and integrated. Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of returns across the
days of the week for the 1988-2001 period.
The return analysis around holidays is an additional test for the closed-market eﬀect.
We ﬁnd that for the 1988-2001 period, returns before holidays are on average 23 times
higher than on regular days. Moreover, we ﬁnd that for the 1988-1996 period, returns are
signiﬁcantly positive before holidays and negative after holidays and this diﬀerence increases
with the number of non-trading days around holidays. This result reveals evidence of a
closed-market eﬀect. Similarly to the weekend anomaly, the holiday eﬀect tends to vanish
for the 1997-2001 period.
The monthly eﬀect is not empirically supported. The January and the August returns’
patterns, especially during 1997 and 1998, are consistent with the international indexes
performances, namely EuroStoxx 50, FT 100 and the instability caused by the upgrade
of the Portuguese stock market that started to be internationally considered as a devel-
oped market. Finally, returns around the end of the month do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer and
therefore our results do not support the existence of a turn-of-the-month eﬀect.
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Table I 
 Evidence of The Weekend Effect 






Country of Analysis: UK. FT 30 Index, Jul1935-
Dec1994. Linear Regressions with 5 seasonal 
dummies. Other samples: 35-39, 40-44…90-94. 
Negative mean returns on Monday. Significant day-of-the-
week effect on 35-94 and on 6 sub-samples. Monday had 




Country of Analysis: UK. FTO and FTAS 
Indices: Jun1975-May1981. Summary statistics 
for the days of the week. Other samples: Jun75-
Dec76, Jan77-May78, Jun78-Dec79 and Jan80-
May81. 
Nonnormal returns, negative mean returns on Monday, 
stronger for 75-81, 75-76 and 77-78. Evidence of day-of-
the-week effects. Autocorrelation. More strongly negative 




Country of Analysis: UK. FTA Index. May1962-
Apr1986. Other samples: May62-
Apr68…May80-Apr86. Summary statistics for 
the days of the week. Linear regressions: 8 
seasonal dummies and the return’s 1
st lag. 
Significant negative Monday mean returns (62-86 and 62-
68). Significant day-of-the-week effect (62-86 and 62-68: 
1%; 74-80 and 80-86: 5%). Nonnormal returns. Evidence 
of autocorrelation. Positive 1
st account mean returns and 
negative Monday not 1
st account mean returns. 
Friday/Monday mean returns: lower than in other days. 




Country of Analysis: UK. FT-SE 100, FT-SE 
Mid 250 and FT-SE 350 Indexes and 29 industry 
baskets, grouped in: finance, consumer, 
industrials and others (Jan1986-Oct1992). 
Summary statistics for the days of the week.  
Negative Monday returns, significant for Mid 250 and 350. 
Positive returns for all other days, largest on Wednesdays 
and Fridays. Negative returns for non-account Mondays. 
Positive returns on account Mondays for the 100, not 
significant for Mid 250. Large positive non-Monday first 
account returns. Finance and Consumer: negative Monday 
mean returns (large on non-account Mondays). Industrial 




Country of Analysis: Spain. Madrid Stock 
Exchange Index and 40 most traded stocks 
grouped in Banks and Investments, Utilities, 
Industrial (Jan1979-Dec1983). Summary 
statistics for the days of the week. 
Index, Banks and Investment: Negative and lower mean 
returns on Tuesday; Utilities, Industrial: positive returns 
for all days of the week, highest on Tuesday.  All cases: no 




Country of Analysis: Greece. CFS stock price 
Index: Jan1985-Feb1994. Other samples: 85-87, 
88-94. Summary statistics for the days of the 
week. Linear regression (E-GARCH). 
Negative returns: on Tuesdays (all samples) and on 
Mondays (88-94). Non-normal, stationary and 
autocorrelated returns. Time-dependent variance. Highest 
and positive Thursday and Friday returns. Higher Monday 
returns on 85-87. Tuesday returns became less negative and 
Wednesday returns became higher. 
Cross 
(1973) 
Country of Analysis: USA. S & P Composite 
Index. 1953-1970. Percentages of times the 
index advanced, declined or kept unchanged. 
Percentages of advance: Fridays: 62%; Mondays: 39.5%. 
Percentages of advance after an advance on the previous 
day: Monday: 48.8%; Other Days: 63.9%. Percentages of 
advance after a decline on the previous day: Monday: 24%; 
Other Days: 49%. 
French 
(1980) 
Country of Analysis: USA. S & P Composite: 
1953-1977. Summary statistics and histograms 
for the days of the week. Linear regressions with 
seasonal dummies. Other samples: 53-57…73-
77, every year 
Negative Monday mean returns (the lowest of the week). 
Rejection of the trading and calendar time hypothesis (53-
77 all the sub-samples but the last). Mass of the returns 
histograms: Monday: mostly in the negative region; other 




Country of Analysis: USA. CRSP EW and VW 
indices. Jul1962-Dec1979. Adjusted returns after 
68. Summary statistics for the days of the week. 
Other samples: 62-67, 68-73 and 74-79. Linear 
regression.  
Earlier periods: negative Monday’s and positive Friday’s 
returns (both significant). Friday returns reduced after the 
adjustment. Monday returns were reducing during 68-73. 
Evidence of day-of-the-week effects before 74. 
Abnormally high Wednesday returns. Later periods: 




Country of Analysis:  USA. DJIA. Jan1897-
Jun1986. Summary statistics, for the days of the 
week. Linear regressions: seasonal dummies for 
each day and for Fridays before a trading or non-
trading Saturday. Periods: 97-86, 97-May52, 
Jun52-88, 97-10, 11-24, 25-38, 38-May52, 
Jun52-63, 64-75, 76-85. 
Evidence of day-of-the-week effect (1%). Negative 
Monday returns (significant on 97-86, pre and post May52 
and in 5 of the other sub-periods). 97-24: significant 
Monday mean return (1%) Returns tended to progress with 
the week. In general, significant % of Monday positive 
returns below 50% and % of Friday and Saturday positive 
returns above 50%.   19
Table I 
Evidence of The Weekend Effect - continuation 






Country of Analysis: USA. S&P Composite: 
1928-1982, 28-52 (NYSE was opened 
Monday→Saturday), 53-82 (NYSE was opened 
Monday→Friday). Other samples: 28-32…78-
82. 10 portfolios (63-79). 30 Dow Jones index 
stocks (Jul62-Dec82, Jul62-Dec72 and Jan73-
Dec82). The most 30 traded OTC stocks (78-
82). Summary statistics for the days of the 
week. 
S&P: Significant day-of-the-week effect: 28-82, 28-52, 53-
82 and on 9 five-years samples. Larger Friday return before 
52 Insignificant lower Monday mean return after 53. 
Portfolios: Consistently negative Monday returns. Stronger 
day-of-the-week effect for smaller portfolios. Dow Jones: 
Higher correlation of Friday/Monday returns and non-
autocorrelation equality across the week. OTC stocks: 




Country of Analysis: USA. S&P500, CRSP EW 
and VW indices: 1963-1983. Linear regressions. 
Test the day-of-the-week and the Monday 
effects. Other samples: 63-65…81-83. Tests for 
normality, autocorrelation and ARCH effects. 
Significant day-of-the-week effect ( all indices: 63-83, pre 
74 and 78-80; just for VW: 75-77, 81-83). Significant 
negative Monday returns (63-83, pre 74 and 81-83). No 
normality. Untreated autocorrelation problem. ARCH 
effects. GARCH results: VW Monday positive returns on 
63-65, 66-68, 75-77 and 78-80; S&P and EW Monday 
negative returns disappeared after 74. 
Connolly 
(1991) 
Country of Analysis: USA. S&P500, CRSP EW 
and VW indices; portfolio stocks. 1963-1983. 
Other samples: 63-65…81-83. Summary 
statistics for the days of the week and linear 
regressions. Test the day-of-the-week and the 
Monday effects. 
Mean returns: positive for all days jointly but negative for 
Mondays alone. Insignificant negative Monday mean 
returns post 75. Portfolios: negative Monday returns, 
largely concentrated from 69 to 74. Bayesian and classic 
tests gave contradictory conclusions about day-of-the-week 
effects, especially for the indices. 
Fortune 
(1999) 
Country of Analysis: USA. S&P500, Dow30, 
Wilshire5000, NASDAQ and Russell2000 
indices: Jan1980-Jan1999 (excluding Oct87 and 
days after holidays). Summary statistics: intra-
week days and for weekends. Jump diffusion 
model for weekend and intra-week returns (80-
99, 80-Sep87 and Nov87-99). 
Weekend returns: lower means and less variability. Returns: 
negatively skewed and kurtosis significant above 3 
(strongly for weekend returns). Jump Diffusion Model: 
significant positive mean jump frequency and lower jump 
effect standard-deviation, negative mean jump on weekends 
(S&P, Dow and Wilshire), lower volatility on weekends. 
Positive intra-week total drift (declined after Nov87, as the 




Country of Analysis: Canada. TSE indices: 300 
Composite, 300TR (Jan1977-Jun1989) and VW 
Jan1975-Jun1989. Individual securities:  75-89, 
75-77, 78-79…87-89. Portfolios: 75-89 and 85-
89. Summary statistics for the days of the week. 
Indices: significant Monday negative returns (1%), 
Insignificant Tuesday positive returns. Significant positive 
returns for the other days. Day-of-the-week effects. 1
st 
trading weekday effect: slightly larger than Monday effect. 
5
th trading weekday effect: slightly larger than Friday 
effect. Significant and lower 1
st Mondays within the month 
returns.  Portfolios:  more significant negative Monday 
returns for the largest, negative Tuesday returns dominated 
negative Monday returns for the smallest, significant 




Country of Analysis: Turkey. ISE Composite 
Index: Jan1988-Aug1994. Summary statistics 
for the days of the week. Considers every year 
separately. Linear regressions with seasonal 
dummies (88-94, every year separately, 88-91 
and 92-94). Tests for mean and variance 
equality: one year vs one year and one year vs 
other years jointly. 
Significant positive 1
st order autocorrelation (except in 93). 
Negative Tuesday returns (except in 89). Highest 
(significant) Friday return: 88-94. Not mean equality (16 of 
28 cases). In general, positive relation between Friday and 
Monday returns sign. Significant positive Wednesday and 
Friday returns (88-94). Insignificant negative Tuesday 
mean return. Significant negative Tuesday and Wednesday 
coefficients in 1988 (positive in 89). No significant mean 
returns (90 and 94). Friday returns differed significant from 




Country of Analysis: Australia. 2 Sydney Stock 
Exchange indices and S&P (USA): 1974-1985. 
Other samples: 74-76…83-85. Linear 
regressions. Tests: day-of-the-week effect, 
normality, autocorrelation, ARCH effects and 
independence of Australian and USA day-of-
the-week effects. 
Returns: lower on Tuesday and higher on Thursday. 
Evidence of day-of-the-week effect on 74-85 and until 82. 
Non-normality. No autocorrelation. Presence of ARCH 
effects. Similar results from OLS and GARCH estimation. 
Independence of the Australian and the North American 
day-of-the-week effects.   20
Table II 
Evidence of The Holiday Effect 






Country of Analysis: UK. FT 30 Index, Jul1935-
Dec1994. Summary statistics for 1, 2 and 3 days 
before holidays and for 1 and 2 days after 
holidays. Comparison of mean returns after and 
non-after holidays, by day of the week. 
On Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays mean 
returns were higher following holidays. On Tuesdays, mean 
returns were lower following holidays. Returns 
immediately before and after holidays were much higher 




Country of Analysis: UK. FTA Index. 
May1962-Apr1986. Summary statistics for days 
over Bank Holidays excluding returns over a 
weekend and for Wednesdays, Thursdays and 
Fridays excluding the days over Bank Holidays. 
Returns mean and variance were higher over Bank 
Holidays. Significant variance difference (1%). Means 
weren’t significant different (few observations for the Bank 




Country of Analysis: UK. FT-SE 100, FT-SE 
Mid 250 and FT-SE 350 Indexes and 29 industry 
baskets, grouped in: finance, consumer, 
industrials and others (Jan1986-Oct1992). 
Summary statistics for days before holidays and 
other trading days.  
Mean returns Index: on pre-holidays were around seven 
times larger than for other days; finance and consumer: 




Country of Analysis: USA. S & P Composite 
Index. 1953-1977. Comparison of the mean 
returns on trading days after holidays and non-
after holidays, by day of the week. 
Mean return on Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays and 
Fridays were higher following holidays. Mean returns on 




Country of Analysis:  USA. DJIA. Jan1897-
Jun1986. Summary statistics for days before 
holidays, after holidays and other days (97-86, 
97-51, 52-86, 97-10, 11-24, 25-38, 39-May52, 
Jun52-63, 64-75, 76-Jun86). 
Mean returns on pre-holidays: nearly 23 larger than in 
regular days. 63.9% of positive returns on pre-holidays (97-
86). Pre-holidays rates of return: generally two to five times 
larger than on pre-weekend. All period: negative after-
holidays mean returns (insignificant different from 0 and 





Country of Analysis: USA. CRSP VW and EW 
daily index returns: 1963-1982. Summary 
statistics for pre-holidays and other trading days 
(63-82, 63-72 and 73-82). Post-test for 83-86. 
Graph for mean returns: 1, 2, 3 days before 
holidays and 1, 2 days after holidays; DJIA 
hourly returns: 63-82. Summary statistics 
considering each of the pre and post holiday’s 
hours. 
Pre-holidays EW and VW mean returns: 8.9% and 14% 
larger than in other days (significant difference). EW and 
VW: before-holiday returns significant different than in 
others; VW: after holiday (with 1
stJanuary) returns 
significant different than in others. 83-86: significant 
positive pre-holiday returns (lower point estimates). DJIA: 
high pre-holiday returns, especially at the end of the day. 
Significant pre-holiday close to post-holiday opening mean 
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Table III 
Evidence of the Monthly Effect 






Country of Analysis: UK. FT 30 Index, Jul1935 to 
Dec1994. Linear Regressions with twelve seasonal 
dummies. Considers twelve five-year samples (35-
39, 40-44…90-94). 
For the entire sample, significant positive January, April 
and December mean returns. Positive April mean returns 
for all sub-samples (only 4 significant positive, all before 
59). 4 significant positive January mean returns, after the 
introduction of capital gains tax in 65. Higher mean returns 
in April than in January (4 periods before 65); these results 
reversed after 65. Negative or very small mean returns: 




Country of Analysis: UK. Data from the LSPD. 
Jan1956-Dec1980 (monthly returns). Linear 
Regression with two dummies for each month, for 
56-65 and 66-80 (before and after the capital gains 
tax introduction). Test for the monthly effect in this 
two periods. Tests for tax effects (split securities 
into losers and winners portfolios). 
No seasonality on 56-65. Evidence of monthly effects (5%) 
on 66-80. Mean returns: January – 5.38%, April 3.91%. 
Losers and winners mean return difference: April – before 
66: insignificant negative; after 66: significant positive. 




Country of Analysis: UK. FT-SE 100, FT-SE Mid 
250 and FT-SE 350 Indexes; 29 industry baskets, 
grouped in: finance, consumer, industrials and 
others. (Jan1986-Oct1992). Summary statistics by 
month: all observations, 1
st half and 2
nd half. 
Mean returns Index: significant positive in January and 
February; small or negative in summer and autumn months, 
significant positive in the 1
st half, insignificant in the 2
nd 
half; finance and consumer: large positive on January and 
February, large negative in August and October; large 
positive in the 1
st half, smaller in the 2
nd half; industrials: 
negative in August and October; ‘others’: positive in 
January and February, smaller in the 1





Country of Analysis: Spain. Madrid Stock 
Exchange Index and the 40 most traded stocks 
grouped in Banks and Investments, Utilities and 
Industrial (Jan1979-Dec1983). Summary statistics, 
1
st Quarter, 4
th Quarter, other days.  
Significant mean returns difference through the year (5%), 
except for the utilities sector. Returns go down in the last 
months of the year and go up during the 1
st months of the 




Country of Analysis:  USA. DJIA index. Jan1897-
Jun1986. Summary statistics: by month (monthly 
returns), 1
st and 2
nd halves of the month (daily and 
monthly returns). Periods: 97-May86, 97-May52, 
Jun52-May86, 97-10, 11-24, 25-38, 39-May52, 
Jun52-63, 64-75 and 76-May86; for the December 
2
nd half (97-86, 97-51, 52-85, 97-10, 11-24, 25-38, 
39-51, 52-63, 64-75, 76-85, daily returns); for the 
last 4 and the first 4 month’s trading days: -4, …, -
1, 1, …, 4 (97-86, 97-May52, Jun52-86, 97-10, 11-
24, 25-38, 39-May52, Jun52-63, 64-75, 76-
May86). 
August returns – 97-May52: higher; Jun52-86 – relatively 
low. Evidence of month effects. Positive returns for both 
halves (equal mean returns). Usually higher returns on the 
1
st half. Significant April and December returns difference 
for 1
st and 2
nd halves on 97-May52. Slightly negative 
returns before Christmas. Higher frequency of positive 
returns between Christmas and New Year. 97-86: high 
returns for day–1 to day3. Mean returns on  -1, 1, 2, 3 
significant higher than on –4, -3, -2, 4. 
Ariel 
(1987) 
Country of Analysis: USA. CRSP EW and VW 
indices: 1963-1981. Graph and summary statistics 
for the 9 trading days before the start of a month 
(2
nd half) and after the start of a month  (1
st half) – 
63-81, 63-66, 67-71, 72-76 and 77-81. Summary 
statistics for EW less VW (63-81, 63-68 and 74-81 
jointly, 69-73; 1
st and 2
nd halves of the months, 
excluding January). 
Mean returns 1
st half: significant positive; 2
nd half 
predominantly negative (insignificant); in most of the 
cases, significant higher in the 1
st half; EW less VW: 
positive and insignificant different in 1
st and 2
nd halves (63-
81 and 63-68 plus 74-81), negative mean returns for both 





Country of Analysis: USA. CRSP daily stock 
returns: Jul1962-Dec1981 (900 securities grouped 
into 10 or 30 portfolios). APT model – tests for risk 
premium significance (all sample, Jan vs other 
months, exclude Jan-Feb vs exclude other months). 
900 NYSE and AMEX stocks (same period). 
Summary statistics by month. Stocks grouped into 
10 and 30 portfolios. Test of monthly effects for 
individual stocks (by month, for each portfolio). 
CRSP: More frequently significant risk premiums on 90 
stock groups. Always-significant risk premium in January 
(rarely priced in the other months). Insignificant risk 
premium when excluding January and February returns. 
NYSE and AMEX: larger January mean returns (5 to 10 
times than most other months). Tests: 10 portfolios: 
always-significant difference for individual stocks; 30 
portfolios: evidence of means equality in February, May, 
June, September and October.    22
Table IV 
Analysis of the Weekly Effect 
 
The table reports the OLS estimation where the dependent variable is the BVLG index daily return and the 
explanatory variables are dummies for each day-of-the-week, a dummy for Tuesdays from January 1988 to 
April 1989 - denoted by Tuesday* - and the first three lags of the dependent variable. The t-statistic 
corresponds to the individual test of coefficient’s nullity, the F-statistic corresponds to the test of jointly 
equality of the dummy’s coefficients and the Portmanteau statistic corresponds to the test of residual’s 
autocorrelation. The table also reports the medians, the number of observations and the percentages of 
positive returns by day of the week and for Tuesday*. Periods: 1988-2001, 1988-1996 and 1997-2001. Days 
immediately before or after holidays are excluded. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
 
     Whole Sample       
 Coefficient Std  –Deviation T-Statistic
   Median






Monday -0.00027 0.00039 -0.68 -0.00026 47.6%  565
Tuesday 0.00025 0.00039 0.65 -0.00029 47.5%  630
Tuesday* -0.00219 0.00126 -1.74* -0.00153 36.7%  60
Wednesday -0.00041 0.00037 -1.10 -0.00030 46.9%  622
Thursday 0.00003 0.00037 0.08 0.00002 50.2%  629
Friday 0.00052 0.00037 1.40 0.00016 51.2%  621
1
st Lag  0.24316 0.01790 13.58***  
2
nd Lag  0.00229 0.01853 0.12  
3
rd Lag  0.02205 0.01786 1.23  
F – Test: 1.32 (P-Value: 0.253)  R
2: 0.0638  
Portmanteau Test (12): 12.86  P>χ
2 (12)=0.379  
  1988-1996   
 
Coefficient Std –Deviation T-Statistic
   Median






Monday -0.00051 0.00039 -1.32 -0.00022 47.4%  346
Tuesday 0.00020 0.00039 0.53 -0.00046 44.1%  406
Tuesday* -0.00203 0.00100 -2.02** -0.00153 36.7%  60
Wednesday -0.00030 0.00036 -0.83 -0.00028 46.1%  399
Thursday 0.00053 0.00036 1.50 -0.00013 48.4%  407
Friday 0.00024 0.00036 0.66 0.00005 50.3%  400
1
st Lag  0.34293 0.02243 15.29***  
2
nd Lag  0.04654 0.02358 1.97*  
3
rd Lag  -0.06217 0.02202 -2.82***  
F – Test: 1.83 (P-Value: 0.104)
  R
2: 0.1333  
Portmanteau Test (12): 16.92  P>χ
2 (12)=0.153  
  1997-2001   
 
Coefficient Std –Deviation T-Statistic
   Median






Monday -0.00001 0.00081 -0.01 -0.00046 47.9%  219
Tuesday 0.00049 0.00080 0.61 0.00061 53.6%  224
Wednesday -0.00042 0.00081 -0.52 -0.00064 48.4%  223
Thursday -0.00089 0.00081 -1.11 0.00071 53.6%  222
Friday 0.00087 0.00081 1.08 0.00060 52.9%  221
1
st Lag  0.17741 0.02978 5.96***  
2
nd Lag  -0.02847 0.03059 -0.93  
3
rd Lag  0.06654 0.03007 2.21**  
F – Test: 0.76 (P-Value: 0.628)  R
2: 0.1202   
Portmanteau Test (12): 5.52  P>χ
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Figure 2 
 
Histograms for the Days of the Week – Period 1988-2001 
 
The figure presents the histograms for each day-of-the-week in 1988-2001 and for Tuesdays between January 
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Table V 
 
Analysis of the Weekly Effect for the PSI30 Index 
 
The table reports the OLS estimation where the dependent variable is the PSI30-index daily return and the 
explanatory variables are dummies for each day-of-the-week, the variation of the index from the closing to 
the opening of the day after, denoted by RNight, the product of RNight by the Monday dummy, and the first 
three lags of the dependent variable. The t-statistic corresponds to the individual test of coefficient’s nullity, 
the F-statistic corresponds to the test of jointly equality of the dummy’s coefficients and the Portmanteau 
statistic corresponds to the test of residual’s autocorrelation. The table also reports the medians, the number 
of observations and the percentages of positive returns by day of the week Periods: 1997-2001. Days 





     1997-2001       
Positive Ret   Coefficient Std  –Deviation  T-Statistic   Median 
(% # obsv) 
# of Observ. 
Monday -0.0003332 0.0007427 -0.45  0.0000358 50.2% 219 
Tuesday 0.0006127 0.0007324 0.84  0.0012167 53.6% 224 
Wednesday -0.0009078 0.0007342 -1.24  -0.0006028 48.4% 223 
Thursday -0.0012227 0.0007358 -1.66*  0.0004798 53.6% 222 
Friday 0.0005794 0.000737 0.79  0.000718 52.0% 221 
RNight 0.6306733 0.0339267 18.59***      
RNight * Monday  0.0985008 1.64 0.102      
1
st Lag  0.1154259 0.0257697 4.48***      
2
nd Lag  -0.0220609 0.0260785 -0.85      
3
rd Lag  0.0704868 0.0255044 2.76***      
F – Test: 1.31 (P-Value: 0.266)  R
2: 0.3008    
Portmanteau Test (12): 13.90    P>χ
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Table VI 
 
Analysis of the Holiday Effect 
 
The table reports the means, standard-deviations, medians, number of observations and percentages of 
positive returns from the BVLG index, on days before holidays, on days after holidays and on regular days 
(all observations) and for days before holidays and days after holidays considering that the number of 
calendar days between them is 2 and more or equal than 3. The standard deviations are corrected by the 
Newey-West formula. We consider the periods: 1988-2001, 1988-1996 and 1997-2001. The difference 
between the numbers of observations on days before holidays and on days after holidays in 1988-1996 and in 




   Whole Sample       
 Mean  Std  –Deviation   Median






Before Holidays 0.00184 .0005901   0.00107 58.0% 150 
After Holidays  0.00130 .0009952   -0.00062 46.0% 150 
All 
 
Observations  Regular Days  0.00008 .0002108   -0.00017 48.7% 3067 
Before Holidays 0.00159 .0007608   0.00007 50.0% 78  2 days  
difference  After Holidays  0.00095 .0010669    -0.00059 44.9% 78 
Before Holidays .002102 .0009263   .0012909 66.7%  72  ≥3 days  
difference  After Holidays  .0016843 .0016392   -.0007149 47.2% 72 
   1988-1996        
 Mean  Std  –Deviation   Median






Before Holidays 0.00025 .0004906   0.00026 51.0% 100 
After Holidays  -0.00025 .0007684   -0.00064 45.5% 99 
All 
 
Observations  Regular Days  0.00007 .0002318   -0.00024 47.2%  1958 
Before Holidays 0.00040 .0006631   -0.00088 45.3% 53  2 days  
difference  After Holidays  0.00040 .0007858   -0.00059 46.2% 52 
Before Holidays .0000781 .0006605   .0005367 57.4% 47  ≥3 days  
difference  After Holidays  -.0009754 .001213   -.0008361 44.7% 47 
   1997-2001        
 Mean  Std  –Deviation   Median






Before Holidays 0.00501 .001025   0.00449 72.0% 50 
After Holidays  0.00431 .0023088   -0.00009 47.1% 51 
All 
 
Observations  Regular Days  0.00008 .0004154   0.00031 51.3% 1109 
Before Holidays 0.00411 .0015574   0.00362 60.0% 25  2 days  
difference  After Holidays  0.00203 .0027792    -0.00088 42.3% 26 
Before Holidays .0059068 .0015193   .0048371 84.0% 25  ≥3 days  
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Figure 3 
 
Histograms for the Holiday Effect –1988-2001 
 
The figure presents the histograms for the days before holidays, the days after holidays and the regular days. The figures are 
centered at the zero return line. We consider the periods: 1988-2001, 1988-1996 and 1997-2001. 
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Table VII 
 
Analysis of the Monthly Effect 
 
The table reports the OLS estimation where the dependent variable is the BVLG-index daily return and the 
explanatory variables are dummies for each month and the first three lags of the dependent variable. The t-
statistic corresponds to the individual test of coefficient’s nullity, the F-statistic corresponds to the test of 
jointly equality of the dummy’s coefficients and the Portmanteau statistic corresponds to the test of residual’s 
autocorrelation. The table also reports the medians, the number of observations and the percentages of 
positive returns by month. Periods: 1988-2001, 1988-1996 and 1997-2001. Days immediately before or after 
holidays are excluded. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
     Whole Sample       
 Coefficient Std  –Deviation T-Statistic
   Median






January 0.00073 0.00056 1.30   0.00011 53.4% 279
February 0.00067 0.00060 1.11   0.00043 53.2% 237
March 0.00023 0.00055 0.42   0.00024 52.5% 284
April -0.00065 0.00064 -1.02   -0.00015 48.1% 212
May -0.00048 0.00056 -0.86   -0.00079 43.8% 274
June -0.00046 0.00063 -0.74   -0.00066 44.1% 220
July 0.00028 0.00053 0.53   -0.00005 49.3% 304
August -0.00013 0.00056 -0.24   0.00002 50.2% 277
September -0.00050 0.00054 -0.93   -0.00043 45.4% 295
October 0.00005 0.00058 0.09   -0.00030 46.9% 260
November 0.00008 0.00058 0.14   -0.00027 46.3% 255
December -0.00010 0.00071 -0.14   0.00019 51.8% 170
1
st Lag  0.24133 0.01793 13.46***     
2
nd Lag  0.00089 0.01855 0.05     
3
rd Lag  0.01951 0.01791 1.09     
F – Test: 0.60 (P-Value: 0.828)  R
2: 0.0638   
Portmanteau Test (12): 12.49  P>χ
2 (12)=0.407   
  1988-1996    
 
Coefficient Std –Deviation T-Statistic
   Median






January -0.00013 0.00054 -0.24   -0.00105 46.1% 178
February 0.00019 0.00059 0.32   0.00034 53.4% 148
March 0.00054 0.00054 1.01   0.00039 55.9% 179
April -0.00034 0.00062 -0.55   -0.00030 45.9% 133
May -0.00026 0.00054 -0.48   -0.00075 43.4% 175
June -0.00037 0.00062 -0.59   -0.00054 43.3% 134
July 0.00009 0.00052 0.17   -0.00009 48.2% 193
August 0.00087 0.00054 1.60   0.00025 54.0% 176
September -0.00030 0.00053 -0.57   -0.00051 43.1% 188
October -0.00017 0.00056 -0.31   -0.00052 43.3% 164
November -0.00043 0.00056 -0.77   -0.00055 39.9% 168
December 0.00002 0.00065 0.02   0.00005 50.8% 122
1
st Lag  0.34108 0.02248 15.17***       
2
nd Lag  0.04532 0.02361 1.92*       
3
rd Lag  -0.06307 0.02208 -2.86***       
F - Test: 0.51 (P-Value: 0.900)  R
2: 0.1316       
Portmanteau Test (12): 16.70  P>χ
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Table VII 
 
Analysis of the Monthly Effect – continuation 
 
 
     1997-2001        
 
Coefficient Std –Deviation T-Statistic
   Median






January 0.00272 0.00121 2.24***   0.00327 66.3%  101
February 0.00159 0.00128 1.24   0.00077 52.8%  89
March -0.00050 0.00117 -0.42   -0.00090 46.7%  105
April -0.00109 0.00135 -0.81   0.00051 51.9%  79
May -0.00093 0.00121 -0.77   -0.00103 44.4%  99
June -0.00065 0.00130 -0.50   -0.00085 45.3%  86
July 0.00068 0.00114 0.59   0.00078 51.4%  111
August -0.00222 0.00120 -1.85*   -0.00180 43.6%  101
September -0.00092 0.00116 -0.79   -0.00015 49.5% 107
October 0.00066 0.00123 0.54   0.00064 53.1% 96
November 0.00122 0.00129 0.95   0.00175 58.6% 87
December -0.00051 0.00173 -0.29   0.00111 54.2% 48
1
st Lag  0.16347 0.02996 5.46***       
2
nd Lag  -0.04067 0.03070 -1.32       
3
rd Lag  0.05279 0.03026 1.74*       
F - Test: 1.22 (P-Value: 0.268)    R
2: 0.0461          
Portmanteau Test (12): 4.72    P>χ
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Table VIII 
 
Analysis of the Turn-of-the-Month Effect 
 
The table reports the means, standard-deviations, medians, number of observations and percentages of 
positive daily returns from the BVLG index, on the last four trading days within a month – denoted by Day -
4, Day -3, Day -2 and Day -1 – and in the first four trading days within a month – denoted by Day +1, Day 
+2, Day +3 and Day +4. The t-statistic corresponds to the individual test of mean return’s nullity, Periods: 
1988-2001, 1988-1996 and 1997-2001. The observations for Day -4 through Day -1 correspond to the last 
four trading days from January 1988 to October 2001. The observations for Day +1 through Day +4 
correspond to the first four trading days from January 1988 to November 2001, except the first trading day in 
January 1988 (which corresponds to the price base of the index). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
     Whole Sample       
 Mean  Std  –Deviation T-Statistic
   Median






Day –4  0.00002 0.01047 0.03   0.00007 50.6% 166
Day –3  0.00149 0.01027 1.87*   0.00078 57.2% 166
Day –2  -0.00067 0.00760 -1.14   -0.00019 48.8% 166
Day –1  0.00124 0.00816 1.96*   0.00107 57.8% 166
Day +1  0.00012 0.01314 0.12   -0.00070 45.2%  166
Day +2  0.00082 0.01173 0.90   -0.00013 49.7% 167
Day +3  0.00178 0.01002 2.30**   -0.00007 49.7% 167
Day +4  0.00064 0.00836 0.99   -0.00011 49.1% 167
  1988-1996    
 
Coefficient Std –Deviation T-Statistic
   Median






Day –4  0.00055 0.00657 0.87   -0.00019 49.1% 108
Day –3  0.00077 0.00566 1.42   0.00061 57.4% 108
Day –2  -0.00004 0.00692 -0.06   0.00003 50.0% 108
Day –1  0.00150 0.00628 2.48**   0.00074 55.6% 108
Day +1  -0.00115 0.01042 -1.15   -0.00095 40.2% 107
Day +2  0.00013 0.01116 0.12   -0.00041 44.4% 108
Day +3  0.00119 0.00854 1.45   -0.00029 48.1% 108
Day +4  -0.00029 0.00605 -0.49   -0.00051 45.4% 108
     1997-2001        
 
Coefficient Std –Deviation T-Statistic
   Median






Day -4  -0.00096 0.01532 -0.48   0.00044 53.4% 58
Day -3  0.00282 0.01557 1.38   0.00248 56.9% 58
Day -2  -0.00185 0.00867 -1.62   -0.00040 46.6% 58
Day -1  0.00076 0.01087 0.53   0.00303 62.1% 58
Day +1  0.00244 0.01687 1.11   0.00115 54.2% 59
Day +2  0.00209 0.01271 1.26   0.00327 59.3% 59
Day +3  0.00287 0.01229 1.79*   0.00199 52.5% 59
Day +4  0.00234 0.01133 1.58   0.00117 55.9% 59
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